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PRF."WA!.

Within the limits of a Law School Thesis, it would
be impossible to dis'cuss at length all

the details of practice

in those actions in which judicial sales may be had under the
code.

The subject of judicial sales has beer

in two admirable works:

fully covered

that of Mr.David Rorer of the Iowa

Bar, on Judicial Sales, now in the second edition, published
in Chicago;

and that of Mr.A.C.Freoman on Void Judicial

Sales, also in its second edition, and published in St.Louis.
In neither of these works, however are the references to the
New YorL law at all numerous.

In this thesis I have endeav-

ored to confine myself closely to those principles governing
Judicial Sales laid down in the laws of New York State as
expounded and interpreted by the higher courts of this state.
With this end in view I have endeavored to select carefully
only those decisions of the higher courts of this state bearing directly upon these points.

It will be found however that

the decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the General Terms

-2most casesbeen followed
cited on the following pages have,in
Terms and in
in long lines of reported decisions at Special
Surrogates Courts.
F.A.B.
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CHAPTER I.

A judicial sale may be briefly described as a sale
in which the court is the vendor.

The court takes charge

of the property and offers it for sale, hears the bids of the
would be purchasers by its authorized agents and determines
either, if the sale has been fairly conducted that

it be con-

firmed, or, if injustice has bcon done to any party th
be set aside and

a resale ordered.

it

it is not until this

final determination of the court that the sale is complete,
and it is this final determination by the court that distinguishes a judicial sale from an execution sale.

In the two

kinds of sale, often termed judicial, namely, execution sales
and judicial sales proper, the officer making the sale, thoup
he may be the sheriff in either case, acts in an entirely
different capacity.

in the execution sale the officer mak-

ing th( sale acts in his ministerial capacity, and the law
regards him and not the court as the vendor.

When he has

-2completed the sale the title of t he vendde is completc,so far
as any further judicial act is concerned.

in

the judicial

sale the officer bears an entirely different relation to the
subject matter of the sale.

He has been commisioned by the

court to act as its agentto receive bids for a particular
parcel or parcels of land and render his report of the same.
His commision is only for the one particular transaction.
When the report of the commisioner is rendexed the court thn
determines upon the acceptance of the bid and when this final
decision of the court is rendered than is tbe sale binding on
the parties, unless some rule of law intervenes
relieve.

to vary or

It also is to be observed that the sale is not

made by any individualwho may ciance to own the land,but by
the court.
Perhaps the best illustration of a judicial sale of land,
under the laws of New York State,

is a sale in Surrogate's

court of the real estate of the decedent ordered by the

Surro-

gate in a proceeding to mortgage, lease or sell real estate
for the payments of debts.(l)
ceedings is as follows.

A brief outline of the pro-

Some party,by law entitled presents

(1). Code Civ.Pro., sections,

2 7 5 0 T 2 80 1

.

-3a petition to the surrogate, who has taken jurisdiction of
the decedent's est:ate and issued letters thereon, for leave
to lease, mortgage or sell the real property of the decedent
for the payment of his debts.

Upon the filing of sudb a

petition, a citation is issued to the parties entitled to
notice of such a proceedings.

Upon the return-day, proof

Is taken as to the debts outstanding against the estate and a
decree entered establishing such as are allowed.

Three com-

missioners are then appointed to determine whether a sufficient sun for the payment of these debts Man be raised by a
lease of or a mortgage on the premises.

If on the report of

these cowmissioners, it appears that sufficient money cannot
be realized from the leasing and mortgaging of the premises,
then a sale will be ordered.

The party authorized to sell

must file a bond before executing the decree of the court.
Then upon due notice, given as prescribed by statute., the sale
is held.

Then notice ,-ill be given of the application for

the confirmation of the referee's report of sale, and on the
return day the proofs as to the manner of conducting the sale
will be heard, and at this hearing any proof may be offered

-4why the sale should be set aside.

It is upon this day that

the court performs the at characteristic of a judicial sale
in determining upon the confirmation

or

setting aside of

the sale and entering its decree accordingly.
After having thus determined the difference between a
judicial sale proper and execution sales and having giving
a true example of a judicial sale as found in ordinary practice under the New York Code of CivilProcedurq,it remains for
us to discover what irrgularities will and what will-,not,
set aside a judicial sale as void.
" In order that the sale of property by the court shall
be fair, and that no one shall be deprived of any right or
interest therein, without due notice and m

opportunity to be

heard, some notice must be given to all parties.

It is not

necessary that the notice contain a minute description of the
premises.

lif the notice is sufficient to indentify the proper-

ty and inform the public what property is to be sold, it will
ordinarily be sufficient."

in addition to the description

of the premises, it is necessary that the time and place of
the sale should be specified.

If the notice of sale contains

American English Encycloped!a of Law,
Wilson v. White, 100 N.Y., 59.
In re Dolan, 26 Hun, 46.

t"

Judicial Sales'

w-

mistakes, or if any omiswions, which are likely to deter or
mislead bidders, or to depreciate tle

value of the property or

to prevent it from bringing a fair price, occur, such omissions
or mistakes will be fatal to the validity of the notice and
also to that of the sale made pursuant thereto.
Mr.Freeman, in his work on Void Judicial Sales, divides
sales that are void into two great classes;
First.

o auThose that are void because the court had -.

thority to enter the judgment or order of sale.
Second.

Those,which though based on a valid judgment or

order of sale are invalid from sume vice in the subsequent
proceedings.
But the distinction is to be made between the proceedings
that are absolutely void and those that are only voidable
If the proceedings is absolutely void, any stranger may take
advantage of the defect.

This is not the case in sales

which are voidable only.
In the discussion of the law relating to these sales the
cases referred to will be mostly those of sales of decednt's
e for the purposee
~d
•eat- est a~e . i-n
----------------------------------------------- ------

Void judicial Sales, Ch.I. sec.l.

-6of partitioning real property and sales made under judgment of
forecleure in mortgage foreclosure proceedings.
The first general principle that seems to be well supported by the New York cases is-- That sales nade by a court not
having jurisdiction to make the same are void.
Proceedings to divest the title to real estate in Surrogate's court are strictly statutory and as such the statute
must be strictly complied in order that the title may be divested.

This means that there must be no substantial de-

parturo from the statuto,.y requirements.

Thus if the cita-

tion is made returnable 6efore the time limited in the statute
the court acquires no jurisdiction and the effect is irreparable.

Following out this same principle in the case of

Bostwick v. Atkins, the court, on the question of jurisdiction, says. " Although the statute makes no mention of the
latter objection ( as to the jurisdiction of the Surrogate)
yet it is competent for the defendants to raise it and avail
themselves of it,

if

well founded,

as tie want of jurisdiction

would render tie whole proceedings , sale as well as conveyance, void and it is impossible to confirm a nullity."
------------------------------------------------Stillwell v. Swarthout, 81 N.Y., 109.
Bostwick v. Atkins, 3 N.'.o, 53.

-7It was hold in Jenkins v. Young, that the failure to
mention the plaintiff ( this action being ole for ejectment)
in the petition to the Surrogate for the disposition of th
real estate of a decedent rendered the proceeding void as to
this plaintiff who should have 1een made a party.

This was

he

held to be true in spite ofcurative statute which was essentially to the same effect as the present Code provision;
that defects in the proceeding shall not effect the title
a bona fide purchaser.

of

In this case the court said. " The

systems of statutes for the protection of purchasers was
deemed necessary and proper to give more confidence in titles
derived from those sales, (sales made under the order of a
Surrogate) to aid them by presumption and shift the burden of
proof on to those seeking to impeach them and to disregard
and overcome irregularities and informalities and even some
defects which may have been deemed jurisdictional to the extent to which the provisions could be deemed to apply but
they have not been construed to overcome the essentialc-jurisdictional omissions which substantially affect and defeat the
t
opportunity of those interested in the property to be heard."

--------------------------------------------------------Jenkins v. Young, 35 TIhu,
569.
Laws of 1850, Ch.82, sec, 2.
Code Civ. Pro., secc, 27 34.

0

When the proceddings for the foreclosure of a mortgage
ha

bcen fraudulently conducted an action to set them aside

will lie as in other cases of fraud.

Judicial sales when

fraud is present are therefore voidable and not absolute void.
But if the court has acquired jurisdiction and there
has been no fraud in the proceedings '.ut there has been some
irrgularity we will have another line of inquiry.
the effect of mere irregularity ?

What is

The order of confirmation

in a judicial sale acts as a final judgment in the action.
If then the court has acquired jurisdiction any irregularities
not affecting the jurisdiction, will be cured by tre order of
confirmation which is bindingon all iarties.
A sale will not be set asido for mere want of knowledge
on the part of some party of the time and place of the sale.
The reason for setting aside a sale must be a legal one.

But

mere want of knowledge may become a legal reason for setting
aside a judicial sale if the circumstances are such as lead
to the conclusion that a party has teen purposely misinformed
for t1B purpose of preventing his bidding.

Where a stay v.d

been improperly granted and 1L d been set aside and the sale
------

-------------------

--------------------

Vandercook v. The Cohoes Saving Institution, 5 Hun, 641.
Wood-hull v. Little, 102 N.Y., 165.
McCotter v. Jay, 30 N.Y., 80.
Corwith v. Barry, 69 Hun, 113.

-0proc(ed(.d the party who had the original stay could not have
the sale set aside on the ground that he did not know of the
sale in time.

lie would thus have profitod by his own wrong.

So where the proceedings are entirely regular and free from
fraud and the party is entitled to relief on some mere equity
his remedy is by a motion in the action in which the proceddings were had anc not by action.
Generally we may say that the court as a court of equity
in its discretion, will not set aside a judicial sale for
some mere technicality, when the party has brought the misfortune on himself by his own act or where the fault can
injure no one.

For example an assignee of a mortgage is made

a party defendant individually but not as assignee, but as he
had no other property in the premises except as assignee, the
coutt held that he was bound by the judgment.
In the case of Kopp v. Congor, the mortgagor requested
the sheriff to sell the premises by sections.
as requested selling the south half'first.
the south half would include

The sheriff did

It turned out that

ll the dwelling house except the

----------------------------------------------------------Peck v. New Jersey & New York R.R.Co., 22 Hun, 129.
Vandercook v. The Cohoes Saving Institution, 5 Hun, 641.
Goodell v. Harrington, 76 N.Y., 547.
Knight v. 111aloney, 4 Hun, 33.
vagner v. Hodgo, 34 Hun, 524.
Kopp v. Conger, 50 N.Y., 635.

-10shed.

A motion was made to set the sale aside on the ground

that the line had been indefinite but the motion was denied.
The sheriff had simply done as requested and the mortgagor
should have known where a line dividing the south half

weaI t run.
Any defect therefore, which goes to the jurisdiction of
the court mad thus to the very life of the whole prooeeeing,
may render the sale absolutely void as to any parties whose
rights have been cut off.

If there has been fraud in any

stage of the proceeding th, sale may be voidable but not absolutely void.

But if the court ]aiLs acquired jurisdiction

and mere irregularities have occuIrred during the course of
the proceeding, if injustice has been done to any party
thereby, the sale may be avoided if the motion is made in the
proceeding before confirmation.

If however a party has brought

the injury on himself the coutt will not avoid tl-e sale to relieve him.

After the confirmation we may say that the court

will not consider a sale void or even voidable for mere irregularities t1at have not affected the jurisdiction of the
court or worked injustice to any party.

-11-

CHAPTER iI.

Passing over the formalities that must be completed
before the sale, wn will

to

suppose the sale bo.;
A

actually

going on andtthe question will natually arise who can bid and
become a purchaser at the sale.

Only in connection with

sales in Surrogate's court do we find any express limitations
in the New York statutes on the rights to become purchasers
at judicial salcs.

In these sales t]B

Code provides that

the person making the sale or the guardian of an infant interested in the sale, unless ;crmission is granted by the
Surrogate to buy for the benefit of the ward , cannot be purchasers.
The courts aim to have thi

sale as fair as may be and

all combinations forthe purpose of reducing the bids or the
number of bidders are looked upon with judicial disfavor.
In the case of Brackett v. Wyman, the action was on an agreement not to purchase at a mortgage foreclosure sale, and the
court held that the agreement was void as against public

----------------------------------------------------------Code Civ. Pro. sec. 2774.
Bracket v. Wyman, 28 N.Y., 667.

-12policy.

But such agreemcnts are not necessarily void if

the object be to protect the rights of the parties and not
a fraudulent intent to keep down the price.
the court said.

In a late case

" The courts will now look at the intention

of the parties and if that be fair and honest and if the primary purpose be not to suppress competition but to protect
their own rights and there be no fraudulent purpose to'injure
or defraud others interested in the result of the sale the
agreement not to purchase may be upheld."
To understand what are the rights and liabilities of t1h
purchaser before the confirimiation of the sale we must revert

Ci/s4racte ~

tiC

to leading~of the judicial sale the confirmation itself.
After the confirmation the rule !-caveat emptor" applies in
all its rigor to the judicial sale, but not before.

The

American & English Encyclopedia of Law, says that this rule
applies at least in a medified degree to a technical judicial
sale.

But in this article the distinction is clearly not

closely drawn between judicial sales and sales under execution
and this statement is evidently intended to apply to ezecution sales as the writer continues " as a general rule the
- ---------------------------------------Hopkins v. Ensign, 122 N.Y., 144.
8 American Law REcord, 385.
American & English Encyclopedia of Law, "Judicial Sales."

-13purchaser acquires just such title

or interest as the execu-

tion debtor ."1
At the time of the hearing on the question of confiriation all parties interested in the premises have their day
having a distinct
in court, together iwith the new party
Any ajpli ation for relief
interest, namely the ppurchaser.

by the original party or the purchaser should be made at this
time, for after the court has once accepted the bid of the
purchaser, and given its judicial sanction to the transaction,
the rights of all parties are fixed.

The rights of the pur-

chaser seemed to have been well sunm.ed up as follows. 11The
purchaser will not be forced to complete the purchase when
the sale was not made at his riskand he cannot be placed in
possession without resorting to an action of eje tment, or
when he cannot have a clear title."

If

,

however, the pur-

chaser has fair notice of any defects in the title, and.buys
with such notice

,

he will not be heard to say that he will

not complete the purchase on the grounds of that defect.
What then are some of the defects which have been allowed as
of sufficient cause to relieve the purchaser ?.
Rorer on Judicial Sales, sec, 213.
Stephens v. Humphreys, 73 Han, 199.

-14" A purchaser at a judicial sale is not obliged to accept the title where the premises are in possession of a tenant claiming under a lease thereof.

It is not any answer to

his objection to complete his purchase'( whnere it appears that
the tenant was not a party to the partition suit in which the
sale was ordered to be had and was therefore Lot concluded
by the judgment therein)' hat the lease under which tle

tenant

holds posscssion was not made by any person having authority
to make it and was therefore void."

If the purchaser cannot

obtain possession under tbe decree he is not oompelled to
complete the purchase.
If there are

ay defects or irregularities in the pro-

ceeding9, in which the sale is had, which will require further proceedings to corrcct them an objection to the completion of the purchase based on such defects will be good.

The

purchaser will not be compelled to accept a doubtful title.
In the judicial sale the utmost fairness will be observed and
a purchaser will not be compelled to complete hi2 purchase
when he has bid at the sale under an honest misapprehension
and subsequently discovers that he has not bought the property

----------------------------------------------------------Kopp v. Kopp, 48 Hun, 532.
Hirch v. Livingstone, 3 Hun, 0.
Toole v. Toole, 112 N.Y., 333.
In re Hughes, 33 Hun, 300.
enn v- Herbs 5 Hun, 457.

-15for

for which he supposed he was bidding and at oncc aplies
relief.

So if there has been fraud upon the face of any

transaction upon which the title is dependent the purchaser
will be relieved.
The purchaser xrill not be compelled to accept a title
that x.ill

subject him to the liability of a cont-es t.
,

co
Cd

n F 7'-tste

But it

o, i'tl

e

would seem that twenty years of adverse possessionAwhiuhL
a purchaser will be compelled to accept.

But if there is

any doubt that the possession has been adverse then the purchaser will be relieved.
In the case Breckenbaugh v.

Nally, a tenant in possession

of the premises had the right to remove a building from the
same.

No notioe was given of this right at tlu

sale and

the -urchaser bought in ignorance of the right and it was
held that he need not complete his purchase.
It has been held that a purchaser at a partition sale
might refuse to complete his purchase whgn a party to the
action who had an interest in the premises had died leaving
children who had not been made parties to t t action.

----------------------------------------------------------People v. Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. 33 Hun, 393.
Jordon v. Poillon, 77 N.Y., 518i
Argell v. Raynor, 20 Hun, 267.
Shiner v. Shiner, 86 N.Y., 575.
Bveckonbaugh v. Nally, 22 Hun, 100.
Miller v. Peck, 100 N.Y., 194.

-1-

But the purchaser not only has a right to a good title
but also a conveyance at a fixed time.

If there is any un-

reasonable delay in funishing him a conveyance that fact will
constitute a sufficient anLwer to an application to compel
him to complete his purchase.
From the examples given we may say that in New York the
rule as laid down in Rorer on Judicial Sales is substantially
correct.

But it may be elaborated to coVer oases that are

covered only by implication in the rule cited above.
In

New York when the purchaser has had

no notice of any

incumbrance uon the property, or any outstanding claims that
have not been cut off or will not be cut off by a decree of
confirmation, the purchaser will not be compelled to complete
his purchase.

And tlny see,

to have gon-

a step further in

one case at least and have said that it is also incumbant on
the party wishing to sustain

,he sale to show that all claims

have been actually :ut off.

If le has been mistaken as to

the pr~nises as to situation or condition, by no fault of lis
own he will in many cases be relieved.

And it would seem

that, even when he might have at least constructive notice of

--------------------- -------------------------------------Rice v. Barrett, 99 N.Y., 403,
Lyon v. Lyon, 67 N.Y., 250.

-17the defect in the title, prior to the purchase, if t1

defect

is caused by fraud in the chain of title he will be relieved.
And lastly, even if the title is in no way

defective if

there is any unresonable delay in delivering the conveyance
and putting the purchaser in possession he may not be compelled to accept the same.
But while the cases are numerous in which the purchaser
will berelieved it is not aS a matter of course.

The con-

firmation of the sale is a discretionary act of the court,
and if, taking all the circumstances into consideration,
the court thinks that substantial

justice hasbeen

done to

the purchaser, he may be compelled to complete his -purchase
even if there aie some equities by virtue of which he seeks
relief.
At a judicial sale the purchaser bids on the assumption
that there are no undisclosed defects."

Objections which are

merely ,,aptious or mere suggestions of defect which no reasonable man would consider, although

within tIB

range of pos-

sibility or those which are clearly invalid by the law as
settled, whatever doubts at a former time may have existed as
Bradley v. Leahy, 54 Hun, 390.
Fleming v. Burnham, 100 N.Y., 1.

-18to the question raised are not available to a purchaser and
will be disregarded.1"
later case.

The sane theory is followed in a

The question raised by the purchaser was that

there was no absolute proof that one of the parties to the
action was dead.

The fact was disclosed however that the

party had been gone for forty
from during that time.

years and had not been heard f

The court said 11But the rule is not

absolute that a disputable fact not determined by the judgment
is in every case a bar to the enforcement of the sale.
depends in some degree on discretion.

It

If the existence of

the alleged outstanding is a very improbable and remote contingency, which, according to ordinary experience has no
probable basis

,

the court may, I suppose, compel the pur-

chaser to complete the purchase."
When a purchaser at a sale has knowledge of defects in
the title of the property purchased and bids with such knowledge he cannot afterwards refuse to complete his purchase on
the grounds that those defects exist.

On a partition sale

notice was given that certain persons having interests in the
premises had hot been made -Parties to the action and their
Terry v Sampson, 112 N.Y., 415.
Fryer v. Rockefeller, 63 N.Y., 268.
Cromwell v. Hull, 07 N.Y., 200.

-19-

rights had not been reftered to in the decree but the sale
was expressly made subject to the rights of these parties.
It was hold in this case that the purchaser having full
notice of the existence of the outstanding rights at the time
he made the purchase would not be relieved on the ground
that such rights existed.
A certain notice of sale in a partition action read simply

"

a farm of thirty one acres. "

The judgment directed

the sale of certain premises and describing them by a descript
'1

ion which closed thus

"

cantaing thirty one acres more or less.

After buying the purchaser discovered that the farm only contained twenty fout acres and he sought to be relieved on the
,round.

The court said that he was negligent and that he

must complete his pyrchase.
Under ordinary circumstances therfore we may say in New
York, that in three classes of cases at least, the purchaser
will not be relieved although he q

suffer some hardship

if compelled to complete the purchase.
First.

If the defect in the title is a mere possibility of

an outstanding claim.
-------------v

Dennerlein v. Deimnerlein, 11l N.Y.,

-e-,-------------------

518.

-20If he had knowledge of the defects in the title

Second.

at the time he rude his bid.
exact

If he might with due diligence ascertained tle

Third.

facts of the case, and he neglects so to do he may be held to
have known

what he thus could have discovered.

But it does not appear just what degree of diligence must be
exercised.

In

the case"ocited abov,

ment was correct was doubtless

tlE

fact that the judg-

considered to give the pur-

chaser constructiv!. notice of the amount of land to be sold.
When the purchaser is compelled by the decree to complete
his purchase he will be guilty of contempt of court if he
disobeys the decree.

A motion may be made to compel him to

complete his purchase, if he is responsible, or pay the deftciency as tie

case may be.

if

le fails to comply with the

order he may be arrested and imprisoned for contempt.

This

would seem to be true even if the court had imprudently or
erroneously granted the order.

So long as the order stands

it is binding on all parties it must be obeyed and cannot he
attacked in a proceedings to punish for disobedience.

The

remedy is by application to vacate the ordb r or by appeal.

---------------------------------------------Day v. Bergen, 53 N.Y., 404.

-21-

In all cases the court will seek to do what is
between the parties.

e-quitable

In the case of Knight v. Maloney, the

purchaser's wife had an interest in the premises sold and she
was aninfant.

Wo guardian ad litem was appointed for her.

Her husband refueed to complete his purchase on this ground.
But as his purchase of thepremises

would vest in the wife a

right of dower in the same, ivhich would be greater than her
original interest it was apparent that the refusal to complete the purchase was not in good faith.

But while the

court did not compel him to complete his purchase, he was
compelled to pay part of the expenses of tho resale.
The purchaser may have other rights at the hearing on
motion for confirmation besides seeking relief.

It often

happens that the purchaser is willing and anxious to complete
the purchase and other parties are endeavoring to have it set
aside.

If the purchaser would acquire rights by becoming

possessed of the property or get a good bargain even when he
has paid fully what the proporty is worth, he may insist upon
having his title confirmed.

If he has made the best bid t1r

law gives him the right to insist upon his bid being accepted.
--------------------- ------------Knight v. Maloney, 3 ilun, 33.

-22The objection most often raised in opposition to the
purchaser, by the parties who seek to have the sale set asidae,
It is usually

is that the price paid has been inadqquate.

necessary to show, however, that there has been some injustice in the conduct of the sale before it will be set aside
for a mere inadequacy of consideration.

It will not be suf-

ficient to set aside the sale, that some party comes into
court and says that if a resale were ordered le thinks he
will give more.

If he should have come to that conclusion

sooner and bid when he had an opportunity.

in the cese of

Klein v. Mastorton, an application was rade to the surrogate
to have the sale set aside on the ground that on a resale
ten percent more could be realized therefrom.

But the court

said that this in itself was not sufficient ground for setting
the sale aside.
At the hearing on the question of confirmation, therefore
the purchaser's rights are as sacred as those of any other
pa ties.

Some good reds on must be shown why he should not

have a conveyance of the property,

and the mere fact that

party now thinks he will give more for the property will
K-----------------------------

Kain v. Hasterton, 16 N.Y.* -174.

-23not constitute such a reason.

If the purchaser has given

all that the property would bring at the timeof the sale,
he is entitled to have the sale confirmed and a decree for a
conveyance entered accordingly.

CHAPTER IiI.

The order of confirmation will ordinarily direct
that the sheriff or referee who has made the sale execute to
the purchaser a conveyance of tle

premises sold.

The con-

veyance is in the form of a deed and usually refers to the
order of confirmation and in the sale in surrogates' courts
also to the decree of sale and the order to execute it.
The conveyance completes the formality of the sale and
the proceeding, so far as the purchaser is concerned, is
ended.

The purchaser is now entitled to possession of the

premises and we may say generally tha

he has a title thereto

good as agiinst all the parties to t- o proceedings.
title is perfect and rests uon the judgment an

His

the order

confirming the referee's report.
By thecode it is provided that in sales in surrogates'
court that the sale vests in tm e grantee the right and interest of the decedent in the premises at the time of his death

------------------------------------------------------- -Code Civ. Pro. sec. 2776.
Kirk v. Kirk, 137 N.Y., 510.

-25free from any claim of his widow for dower that has not been
The provision in partition being similar, the

admeasured.

dower interest attaching to the money paid into court.
Upon this
tration.

-oint two cases will be sufficient for illus-

In the case of Rockwell v.

ludamett in

Mfartin, an interlocutory
adjudged that the exec-

an action for partition

utors and trustees of the testator were entitled to an undivided one-third of the property interest, to apply the income
to the use of one of the testator's daughters during her natur. 1 life and that

at her death the remainder was to go to

her lawful issue if any survived her;

and in the default of

such issue tt was go to her sisters or their issue.

And the

final judgment ordered one-third of the proceeds be paid to t
the said executors and trustees.

The purchaser refused to

complete his purchase upon the ground that the judgment did
not properly protect the interests of the contingent remainder
man in thetrust fund and that it should have directed the
payment of the fund into coutt.

The court hell that the

validity of title of a purchaser under a judgment in partition
would not be affected by ma

error thprein in the manner of

Lawrenco v. i'iiller, 2 N.Y., 244.
Code Civ. Pro, sec 2778, and 1568.
Rockwell v. Martin, 33 THun, 343.

-26protecting the contingent interests of remaindcrmen.
It is within the discretion of the court in a partition
suit to direct a sale of the premises and when a sale is ordered the title of the purchaser is deemed good not only
against the parties to the action and their representatives
but also against one alaiming from or under such parties by
title accruing after the filing of a proper notice of the
pendancy of the action.

The code make s provisions in all

these case for the disposition and disttibution of the money
paid into court by the purchaser,

in each of these cases

many interesting questions may arise as to this distribution.
After the conveyance however the third party to the proceedings, the purchaser, is no longer interested and as it is the
peculiar relation of the court to the purchaser that characterizes the judicial sale, we may well leave the purchaser to
the quiet enjoyment of the premises under the conveyance awarded him by the decree of the court.
------------------- ------------------------------- --

Brooks v. Davy, 100 N.Y., 495.

